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7.1  Introduction 
The United States public economy is a federalist economy. Public 
services are financed and purchased by federal, state, and local gov- 
ernments each with autonomous decision-making authority, but each 
intimately connected to the others through  an elaborate network of 
grants-in-aid and regulations. Historically, it has been an evolving struc- 
ture marked by  significant shifts in responsibilities and control.  I  Most 
recently the trend in financial responsibility has been upward, toward 
the federal level, while the state-local sector has become the primary 
provider of (nondefense) public services.* The decade 1965-75, called 
the period of  “creative federalism,” marked a significant acceleration 
in those trends. During this period the number of federal grants to the 
state-local sector went from 160 separate aid programs in  1965 to 412 
by  1976. Federal to state-local aid grew from about $66 per capita in 
1960 to $192 per capita in 1980, both measured in 1972  dollar^.^ Almost 
all of these transfers imposed significant  federal regulation and spending 
requirements upon the recipient state and local governments; the one 
exception is General Revenue Sharing, which comprised only 8 % of 
all aid transferred in  1980. 
In January  1982, President Reagan proposed a significant reform in 
our current fiscal structure. Under the label of the “new federalism,” 
Reagan has offered a three-part reform package whose objectives were 
to decentralize fiscal choice through a consolidation  of  grants and a 
relaxation of  federal requirements,  and to shrink the size of  federal 
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government spending through a gradual reduction in overall dollar sup- 
port. First, sixty-one federal programs  in  education, community  de- 
velopment, transportation, and social services will be returned to the 
states for state financing and administration. To  help defray the costs 
of these programs, a $28 billion federal trust fund supported by existing 
federal excise taxes will  be established. The trust fund will be fully 
funded until  1988, at which time it will be reduced in four equal steps 
until, by  1992, no additional federal support will be offered. However, 
the supporting federal excise taxes will be discontinued as federal taxes, 
and the states may, if they wish, institute these taxes as their own after 
1992. Second, the federal government will turn over to the states for 
state financing and administration  the present Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. To help the states assume this 
financial obligation,  the federal  government will,  third, assume full 
financial and administrative responsibility for the current state-run and 
state-supported Medicaid program. As initially calculated, the dollars 
flowing to the states from the trust fund and the federal assumption of 
Medicaid  would just equal the added program costs to the states of 
AFDC and the sixty-one released federal programs. The initial effects 
of the exchange would leave the fiscal structure basically unchanged; 
one redistribution program (Medicaid; health care for the poor) would 
be traded for another (AFDC), and block grants (the trust fund) would 
replace categorical aid (the sixty-one existing programs). In the long 
run, however, the Reagan administration hopes to “cap”  and reform 
the current health insurance system (including Medicaid), to phase out 
the trust fund aid, and to foster interstate competition to discourage 
the growth of the state-local sector. If this program is successful, the 
end result  will be a more decentralized  public  sector and perhaps a 
smaller one as well. 
Will the new federalism succeed? There is the first question, of course, 
of whether the new federalism will even emerge from Congress suffi- 
ciently intact to have its intended effects. We  shall not make political 
predictions  here.4 In this paper, we are interested in  the economic- 
i.e., allocative-consequences  of Reagan’s reforms assuming they do 
become law. Our work here extends our previous analysis of the new 
federalism (Craig and Inman  1982) in two important directions. First, 
the previous work studied the effect of the fiscal reforms on one im- 
portant state-local service, education. Here we include a second major 
program area-welfare-which  is in many ways the linchpin of the new 
federalism. Second, in order to model two public services it is crucial 
that we specify how grants will influence both services and allow for 
the possibility  of cross-effects  between program  areas. To  do so we 
must specify more carefully than has been done in past research (our 
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in our prior work, however, we will continue to assume federal fiscal 
policy is exogenously set and concentrate instead on the effects of that 
policy on fiscal choices in the state-local sector. It is from this analysis 
that we hope to understand the likely consequences of President Rea- 
gan’s proposed reform of our current federalist fiscal structure. 
7.2  A Model of  State-Local Fiscal Choice in a Federalist Economy 
From the early simple linear determinant models of state-local fiscal 
choice to the more recent median voter specifications, the emphasis in 
the empirical analysis of state-local budgetary allocations has been on 
voter preferences and the fiscal constraint that defines the set of feasible 
public budgets. Figure 7.1 illustrates the now familiar story. 
One resident will be chosen as the representative or “typical”  res- 
ident whose preferences for state and/or local services are decisive in 
the budgetary process. This resident’s preferences are represented by 
a utility function over after-tax private income (y) and public goods 
(g), denoted U(g,  y),  and are shown as a set of indifference curves in 
figure 7.1. Public services (g) are generally assumed to flow from a per 
capita sharing of a public facility (x)  with a population of size n: g = 
x/n. The  public  facility-e.g., a park  or school-is  produced  by  a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology; x costs c dollars per unit. Total 
expenditures to provide a facility of size x  is cx.  Residents may not be 
required to pay all of  cx  for these local services. In a federalist public 
economy, the federal government often assists states and localities by 
either paying a fraction (rn) of those total expenditures directly or by 
offering the locality a lump-sum payment (z)  that can be used to cover 
local service costs. Residents therefore need pay taxes that total only 
(1  - rn)cx - z, the government’s net  expenditure  after deducting 
federal “matching aid”  (rn is the matching rate) and federal “lump- 
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sum aid.” The total tax payment--T  = (1 -  m)cx -  z-will  be shared 
by all residents within the community. If  local taxes are proportional 
taxes, then each resident’s share (denoted +) will equal the resident’s 
share of his or her tax base (h)  in the total tax base of the locality: 
4 = b/(B . n),  where B is the aggregate tax base per resident  in the 
locality. A typical local resident therefore pays a tax (t)  equal to 
c  = +T  = (b/B)  {(I  - m)(cx/n)  - (z/n)}  ,  or 
r  = (b/B)  ((1 - m)cg - (z/n)}  . 
since g  = (x/n), 
To  define after-tax income for the typical resident, we simply subtract 
t  from pretax income  (I),  with  one further adjustment. Since most 
residents can deduct their state or local taxes from their federal income 
tax payments, a dollar of local taxes will not cost the resident  a full 
dollar. For each dollar of local taxes paid the resident saves a fraction, 
q, of  that dollar in  federal  tax payments, where q  is the resident’s 
marginal federal tax rate. The portion of local taxes actually lost from 
pretax income will be  TT = (1 -  q).  Net local tax payments are therefore 
nt, and after tax income, y, is equal to I - nt. This definition of y 
allows us to define the typical resident’s budget constraint when pur- 
chasing private goods (y) and public services (8). From y  = I - nt, 
and the definition oft, we have: 
y  = I - {TT(h/B)(l - rn)c}g + n(b/B)(z/n), 
y+p.g=f, 
or, upon rearranging terms: 
where p  is called the “tax price” of local public services and equals 
{n(b/B)(  1 -  m)c}  and where I^ is called “full fiscal income” and equals 
I  + n(b/B)(z/n).  The budget constraint is drawn in figure 7.1 as the line 
ICD. The kink in the budget line at point C reflects the fact that ex- 
ogenous, lump-sum aid is generally restricted  to be spent only on g 
and cannot be given directly to households; points along the dashed 
extension of the budget line to I are not legally available to the typical 
resident. From the point of view of the resident, lump-sum aid is equiv- 
alent to a free gift of g units of the public g00d.~  From point C,  the 
resident is then free to buy additional units of g  at a “tax price”  of 
p  { = n(b/B)(  1 - m)c} dollars per unit of g. 
The preferred  allocation of the representative resident will be that 
combination of g  and y which maximizes U(g,  y)  subject to the con- 
straint. This is point (g*,  y*) in figure 7.1. As is true in most economic 
models of this form, an increase in full fiscal income (4  or a fall in the 
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i  rises either because before-tax income increases (I)  or lump-sum aid 
per capita increases (zln).  The price, p,  falls either because costs (c) 
fall, or the matching rate (m)  rises, or more local taxes become de- 
ductible (IT falls), or there is an exogenous increase in the average level 
of  the locality’s tax base (B rises). The effects of change in  each of 
these  variables  is captured  in  the  representative  resident’s demand 
curve for public services: 
(1)  g  = fi,  [/Tastes), 
where the comparative statics of price and income changes (normally) 
predicts  dgldp s 0 and  dg/d 3  0.  The taste  variables  (Tastes) are 
assumed to be those of the “typical”  resident who is decisive in bud- 
getary allocations. 
This specification of  state-local fiscal choice has been used exten- 
sively to analyze allocation in a federalist economy; see Inman (1979) 
for a review. However, there has been one matter left unresolved  in 
almost every application of this approach. Who exactly is the typical 
resident whose demand curve is estimated? Vague, but generally un- 
substantiated,  references  to some average income voter are seen to 
suffice. Only recently have there been efforts to give a precise answer 
to this important question. That literature draws its inspiration from 
the classic paper of  Howard Bowen (1943) on the role of the median 
voter in fiscal politics.h 
In  the  special case where  only  one  public  service level  is  being 
decided and decisions are made by  a simple majority rule process- 
school spending by  local districts is the usual example-the  political 
process will  select that  level of services preferred  by the voter with 
the median (fiftieth percentile) demand for the public good. If a service 
level greater than that demanded by the median voter is offered, the 
median voter and all voters with lower demands will vote against it. If 
a service level less than that demanded by the median voter is offered, 
the median voter and all voters with higher demands will vote against 
it. That level of  services demanded by the median voter will defeat all 
other service levels in majority-rule comparisons. The median demand 
voter is decisive and becomes the natural candidate for the “typical” 
resident in the economic model of fiscal choice. 
Tests of the median voter model against recent experiences of  U.S. 
and European local governments support at least two of  the model’s 
central predictions: the demand for local services declines as the me- 
dian voter’s tax price increases (dgldp < 01, and the demand for local 
services increases as the median voter’s full fiscal income rises (dgldj 
> O).’  Yet  one central prediction  of  the model is  rejected. The two 
components of full fiscal income-private  income (0  and lump-sum aid 
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if  n(b/B)  = 1; alternatively, if  IT(~/B)  < 1 the effect of income should 
be greater than the effects of exogenous aid.8 In fact, the empirical 
evidence is uniformly against this proposition: (zln) has almost always 
had a larger impact, sometimes twenty times as great, on local service 
demands than I. The large effect of aid on local service demand com- 
pared to the small effect of income has been called the “flypaper  ef- 
fect.”  Since private income belongs initially in private hands and public 
aid is given initially into public hands, it appears that dollars “stick” 
where they first land. Yet the demand model predicts dollars are fully 
transferable between public and private uses. Something  more than the 
demand model is needed if we are to rationalize these empirical results. 
That something more is  politic^.^ The  existence of a “flypaper effect” 
implies the presence of a wedge between what fully informed, utility- 
maximizing residents would prefer and what they finally receive from 
the state-local fisc. They would prefer to have lump-sum aid spent as 
private income; what they get is lump-sum aid spent almost entirely 
on public  services. Who or what  is  the wedge that stands between 
public allocations and resident preferences? Romer and Rosenthal (1979; 
1982 with Filimon) have argued that it is a budget-maximizing politician- 
bureaucrat-a  “typical” state-local official-who  is insulated from res- 
ident control.  A desire to maximize the public budget means the bu- 
reaucrat-politician wants to spend all aid.  lo Insulation from voter control 
gives him the freedom to do so. In essence, what Romer and Rosenthal 
have done is introduce a second player into the game of fiscal choice- 
a “typical” state-local official-whose  preferences for how public dol- 
lars are allocated differs dramatically from the preferences of our first 
player-the  “typical”  resident.  We  have a conflict that must be re- 
solved. It is politics, the process of conflict resolution, that will balance 
these competing interests, and it is the analysis of politics that is so 
far missing from our formal models of fiscal choice. 
The Romer-Rosenthal analysis sees the public allocation process as 
a bargaining game between the politician-bureaucrat  and the resident 
voter. The voter retains the ultimate right to veto any budgetary pro- 
posal but the politician retains the right to offer proposals. The game 
is played a finite number of times and if  no agreement is reached, a 
“reversion level”  or fall-back budget is automatically adopted. Poli- 
ticians and voters can talk to each other-there  are budget hearings- 
and they will  seek to strike the best compromise subject to the rules 
of  bargaining.  The model predicts two outcomes that can distinguish 
it from the strict, resident-only demand model:  (1)  lump-sum aid and 
private income need no longer have identical effects, and (2) the com- 
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and the typical state-local official.  I’  The empirical evidence supports 
both predictions.  First, Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1982) find a 
significant flypaper effect-like  most other studies of local budgeting- 
which they attribute to the inability of voters to monitor what public 
officials do with lump-sum aid (a “fiscal illusion”).  Second, they find 
the bargaining process between the voter and the bureaucrat leads to 
a local budget  that is approximately 15% larger than that desired by 
the median voter were he or she decisive alone. 
While one need not embrace all the details of the Romer-Rosenthal 
analysis, their basic point seems hard to ignore. Politics matters. They 
have introduced the state-local official as a second player along with 
the utility-maximizing resident voter into the game of state and local 
fiscal choice. Each player is given the “right  to play”  and must ne- 
gotiate an outcome. Suddenly, it is not just preferences and a budget 
constraint that determine local fiscal allocations; the rules of the game 
matter too. Who are the players? What are their standing and rights 
within the budgetary game? How will conflicts be resolved? These are 
political questions and they require political analysis for answers. The 
simple analytics of budgetary  choice so neatly captured by equation 
(1) will be inadequate when policy choices involve many players and 
many possible public programs. 
Yet  the formal analysis of conflict  resolution  within  a democratic 
process faces a troubling contradiction of theory and fact. In his famous 
(1m)possibility theorem, Kenneth Arrow (1963) proves that there is no 
democratic process involving  more than  two players and more than 
two options that will always yield a determinate outcome. Either mat- 
ters are indeterminate-essentially  “cycling”  from one policy option 
to another-or there is a dictator who decides the final allocation. Only 
in very special and unlikely circumstances (Plott 1967 and Kramer 1973) 
will it be theoretically possible for a democratic choice process to give 
a determinate outcome. No equilibrium is the most likely  result. Yet 
as a factual matter, our democratic fiscal system does arrive at equi- 
librium  allocations  of  services and  taxes. How can we  resolve  this 
apparent conflict of theory with the facts? The answer must  lie in a 
richer theory.  Recent advances in the theory of political institutions 
provide us with what we need. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the central analytic problem for the simple case 
of  two fiscal  options--e.g.,  spending on education (g,)  and welfare 
(gJ-and  three coalitions-e.g, poor (PI, rich  (R),  and  middle-class 
(M)  voters. Each coalition is assumed to have well-defined preferences 
over g, and g,.  These preferences differ, however, and a conflict arises 
that must be resolved. The poor want large welfare expenditures and 194  Steven R. Craig/Robert P.  Inman 
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Fig. 7.2  Majority rule disequilibrium 
relatively low education outlays. The rich  want  modest  welfare ex- 
penditures and large education outlays. The middle class are assumed 
to want modest expenditures on education and low welfare outlays.12 
The conflict resolution process is assumed to be a democratic majority 
rule process in which each coalition has one equal vote.I3 Coalition 
preferences are represented by a “bliss point” or an ideal allocation- 
points P,  R, and M-and  a set of  indifference curves about the bliss 
points representing decreasing levels of well-being as we move away 
from the ideal allocation. The indifference curves are depicted as cir- 
cular for simplicity. The solid lines connecting the bliss points are the 
“contract  lines”  marking the tangencies  of  the  indifference  curves 
between the various pairs of coalitions. The area within the three con- 
tract lines defines the set of Pareto points for this allocation problem. 
A  move from an allocation within the Pareto set (e.g., point  t) to a 
point outside the set (e.g., point 6) will make members of at least one 
coalition worse off  (e.g., coalition P).  Conversely, there is always a 
point within the Pareto set (e.g., pointy) that will make all voters better 
off  compared to its alternative outside the Pareto set (e.g., point  S). 
The important point, however, is there is no stable majority-rule winner 
in  this  game.  As any  point  outside the  Pareto set  will  be  defeated 
unanimously by  some point within the set, we can focus our analysis 
on alternatives such as a,  p,  y,  and  E.  In painvise comparisons by 
majority rule, p (favored by P  and R)  beats a  (favored by M),  cx (favored 
by M and P)  beats y (favored by R),  but now note that y (favored by 
M  and R)  beats p (favored by P).  Point E, which is inside the Pareto 
set, is also caught in a voting cycle. Point E wins over point cx as voters 
P and R prefer E; point a  defeats y as M  and P  prefer a;  but y beats 
E  as M and R  prefer  y.  There is no equilibrium winner  among the 
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To  obtain an equilibrium outcome for this allocation game further 
political structure in addition to majority rule is needed. Shepsle (1979) 
has described and analyzed various legislative institutions that are suf- 
ficient to produce stable, majority-rule allocations. The final allocations 
in  a  Shepsle  equilibrium-often  called  a  structure-induced  equilib- 
rium-are  conditioned by the status quo and the constitutional rules 
that determine legislative structures. Shepsle adds three new structural 
features to the majority-rule allocation game: (1) a committee structure 
that identifies who is allowed to offer proposals for consideration by 
the full legislature; (2)  a jurisdiction structure that defines which pro- 
posals may  be considered by the committee and the legislature; and 
(3) an amendment structure that describes how the committee’s pro- 
posals to the legislature may be altered. Together, these three additional 
rules can ensure a stable allocation. 
Figure  7.3 illustrates one possible  case. The committee structure 
identifies that group which is permitted to submit proposals for con- 
sideration; assume for the example it is group R,  the rich. In figure 7.3 
the jurisdiction structure limits voters to consider only education pro- 
posals; if (gl,  g,)  is the status quo point (denoted p), only policies along 
the line at g, = g2 can be  ~0nsidered.I~  The amendment  structure 
permits voters to consider only the committee’s proposal against the 
status quo; the amendment process is “closed.”15  Group R,  which we 
call the “agenda setter” in this example, will propose the g,  alternative 
along the line at g2  that maximizes R’s utility subject to the constraint 
that it will be approved by a majority in a pairwise comparison with 
the status quo point. R  needs one more vote in addition to its own. 
g1 t 
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That vote will come from the middle class (M),  and the final allocation 
will be at point  E*  = (gr, Gz).  Point  E* is just inside M's indifference 
curve through the status quo-the  position needed to win M's support- 
and  is  the best  that R  can do as an agenda setter subject  to these 
structural constraints. If  group M  were the agenda setter from the 
committee structure, the final equilibrium would be at point p with M 
and R voting for approval and the poor (P)  against. If P were the agenda 
setter, the final allocation would remain at the status quo point, p, for 
group P could not do better and still win support needed from groups 
M  or R to defeat p. 
Figure 7.4 extends the analysis to a case where the  jurisdiction struc- 
ture allows the committee and the voters to consider both dimensions 
of fiscal choice simultaneously. Again, allow R to be the agenda setter 
and point  p to be the status quo. R seeks, as before, to maximize its 
utility subject to the structural constraints and the status quo. R can 
attract group P into a majority-winning  coalition with  any proposal 
along the contract line between points P and S.I6 Group P  is just in- 
different between the status quo and proposal 6; allocations closer to 
point R along the contract line (which group R prefers) will be rejected 
by P in favor of p. If  R chooses to align with group M,  points along 
the R-to-M contract line between allocations y and E** are available; 
allocations  between points  M  and y  are rejected  by  group R  while 
allocations between R and E** are rejected by group M.  Therefore, the 
possible winning allocations  available  to agenda-setter R are on the 
heavy-line segments  YE'*  and PS  in figure 7.4. R will select that allo- 
cation on one of these line segments which maximizes the coalition's 
utility; e.g., allocation E** in figure 7.4. In this example, policy is set 
by  the middle and rich  coalitions.  A  similar analysis will show that 
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that point y is the winning allocation if group M  is the agenda setter. 
All three allocations are stable equilibriums provided the political struc- 
ture, including the status quo point, remains fixed.” 
The concept of a structure-induced equilibrium  provides an irnpor- 
tant element in the needed theoretical framework to begin the analysis 
of fiscal allocations in a federalist economy. Since budget allocations 
are stable over time, it is essential that we have a theory of political 
choice that gives a well-defined  equilibrium  prediction.  Further, the 
theory must generate equilibrium outcomes even when there is conflict 
and the issues are multidimensional. The theory of structure-induced 
equilibriums does just that. To apply the theory of structure-induced 
equilibriums, however, we must close two gaps in  the analysis. First, 
we must  specify the determinants of voter preferences in the policy 
space from a general, underlying preference structure over public and 
private goods. Second, the political theory is a partial equilibrium the- 
ory providing predictions  of budget  allocations given the  status quo 
point and the relevant political institutions. Applications of the theory 
of  structure-induced equilibrium  must  specify which  institutions  are 
relevant  and exactly  how  those institutions  will  influence  budgetary 
choices. 
The starting point for the specification of voter preferences over  fiscal 
policies  is  the individual  utility maximization  model  of fiscal  choice 
that defined the individual voter demand curves in  Generalized 
to the  case of  multiple  public  goods (t =  1,  . . . , G), the  utility- 
maximizing demand model would define a vector of preferred alloca- 
tions, the typical  element of which  is g, = flp,, . . . ,  pG,  IlTastes). 
The optimal level of private goods (y)  will be what is left over after 
the resident pays for the preferred bundle of public goods. For each 
voter or coalition, the vector of preferred public allocations defines the 
voters’ bliss points-e.g., point R,  M,  and P, in figures 7.3 and 7.4 for 
the case of  two public goods.”  The starting point for specifying the 
influence of political institutions on budgetary choices is the fact that 
in  models of  structure-induced equilibriums final allocations  will  be 
weighted averages of the (just specified) voter bliss point-e.g.,  points 
E**, y. or P  in figure 7.4. The institutional structure-status  quo, com- 
mittee, jurisdiction, and amendment structures-will  define the weights. 
If we allow S to represent political structure and f3 the status quo point, 
then the final budgetary allocations of public goods can be specified as 
(2) gf = aK(S,  p) . gf(pR,  fR/Tastes)  + aYS,  P) . gY(pM,  jMITastes) 
+ d(S,  p) . gP(pp,  f,lTastes)  (t =  I,. . . ,G) 
where p, is  the vector of  tax  prices, f3  is  the  full  fiscal  income  re- 
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political weight on the rich coalition, aM(.)  is the political weight on 
the coalition of  middle-class voters, and ap  (= 1 - aR - a”)  is the 
political weight on poor voters. Variables that might be included in the 
vector of political structure include controlling interests (chairmanship, 
majority) of  the key legislative committees that set the agenda, juris- 
diction, and budgetary rules on how dollars can be allocated, size of 
voting blocs within the legislature or community, political allegiance 
of those with veto power over final allocations (e.g., governor, mayor), 
and amendment rules that might allow proposals to be submitted from 
at-large interests.20 
Once estimated, equation (2) gives us exactly what is needed to begin 
to analyze the effects of changes in public dollars and political struc- 
tures on fiscal allocations in a federalist economy. Section 7.3 outlines 
one application of this methodology to state government spending for 
welfare, education, and “other services.” 
7.3  State Spending for Education, Welfare,  and “Other” Services 
President Reagan’s new federalism offers a fundamental reorgani- 
zation of our current federalist fiscal economy, decentralizing many of 
the new federally mandated fiscal activities of the state and local sector. 
Central elements in the reform are the current federal aid programs in 
education and public welfare. These programs now constitute 49.5 % 
of  all federal to state-local assistance.  It seems useful, therefore,  to 
begin our analysis of  fiscal allocations in  a federalist economy by fo- 
cusing on a major, new reform package and on the central components 
of that package. We  do so by specifying and estimating a four-equation 
budgetary  model  of  state allocations  for education,  welfare,  “other 
services,”  and  revenues.  The  model  is  based  upon  the  conceptual 
analysis  of  fiscal choice summarized  by  equation (2)  above, and  is 
estimated for a sample of the forty-eight mainland states over the period 
1966-80. 
Three voter coalitions-a  richhpper middle class (R;  defined as the 
percentage of  families with  income > $25,000), a middle class (M; 
percentage of families with incomes between $5,000 and $25,000), and 
a poor class (P;  percentage of families with incomes less than $5,000)- 
are assumed to determine state budgetary allocations over three ex- 
penditure categories and nondebt, current state revenues (SREV). Ex- 
penditures include state aid to local elementary-secondary education 
(SAE), state payments to low-income families for all state-run welfare 
programs  (SWL), and  “other”  current  account  state  expenditures 
(OEXP). SAE includes all direct state to local educational aid as well 
as all federal education aid given to the states with the requirement 199  Education,  Welfare, and the “New”  Federalism 
that it  be  “passed  through”  to the local units.  SWL includes state 
AFDC payments,  state Medicaid payments,  state general assistance 
payments,  and the  many  small state-run  supplemental  welfare  pro- 
grams. All federal aid dollars that are given directly to the states to 
help defray these welfare costs are included in  SWL. OEXP includes 
all other state expenditures  supported from  nondebt  state revenues 
(SREV), while SREV includes all state tax revenues as well as revenues 
from state user fees and licenses. The model is specified as four be- 
havioral equations and a current accounts budget identity: 
SAE  7 
where c  = SAE, SWL, OEXP, SREV, and 
(4)  SAE + SWL + OEXP = (1 + 4e)SREV + 
LSGRS  + LSEA + CEM + mOSWL  + LSWA + OFA, 
where tax prices (pi,  i = R, M,  P),  full fiscal income (Ii,  i = R, M,  P), 
voter tastes (Tastesi, i = R, M, P), the political structure (S) and the 
budgetary status quo (p) are defined as in  our previous discussion of 
equation (2) above, and where u,  captures the effects of all unmeasured 
determinants of SAE, SWL,  OEXP, or SREV. Equation (4) is the state’s 
budget identity, which relates total expenditures to total current ac- 
count revenue from the state’s own revenues and from the federal-to- 
state grants-in-aid. Our analysis provides a careful disaggregation of 
the effects of federal aid; these aid programs are central to our under- 
standing of fiscal allocations in a federalist economy and to predicting 
the likely effects of the new federalism. Disaggregated federal assis- 
tance includes: (1) federal general revenue sharing measured by  the 
program’s two component parts-a  lump-sum, general revenue sharing 
grant (LSGRS) and a tax effort component that gives states more money 
(at a rate, e) for each dollar raised from a state income tax  (which 
constitutes the share 4 of  total state revenues);21  (2) lump-sum edu- 
cation aid (LSEA, including Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
Title I for the educationally deprived, Title VI for the handicapped, 
and vocational education aid); (3) closed-ended matching aid for edu- 
cation and welfare (CEM, including school lunch, breakfast, and milk 
programs and all low-income commodity assistance aid); (4) open-ended 
welfare matching aid at the federal matching rate m for eligible expen- 
ditures (AFDC and Medicaid outlays are eligible for matching aid and 
constitute a share 0 of  SWL); (5) lump-sum welfare aid (LSWA, in- 
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care);  and (6) other federal aid for current expenditures (OFA, excluding 
highway construction aid but inclusive of other federal-to-state aid not 
already included in revenue-sharing, education, or welfare aid). Since 
the budget identity defines an exact relationship between each of the 
three expenditure categories-SAE,  SWL, and OEXP-and  own-state 
revenues  (SREV) given federal-to-state aid, we  need  only estimate 
three of the four behavioral equations in  (3). We  choose to estimate 
the SAE, SWL, and SREV equations and infer OEXP from the budget 
identity. 
The estimation of  the SAE, SWL, and SREV equations requires the 
approximation of  several of  the independent variables in (3). Specifi- 
cally, we do not have individualized tax prices  or individualized full 
fiscal incomes for the rich, middle-class, and poor coalitions, nor do 
we have measures of the determinants of coalition tastes. We  do have 
measures of  the components of those tax prices and fiscal incomes, 
and plausible correlates with coalition preferences. Coalition tax prices 
have  two elements: open-ended federal  matching  aid  programs  and 
relative population usage. The open-ended matching programs are rev- 
enue sharing (e)  and welfare (m);  while relative population  usage of 
education services is measured by the percentage of school-age  children 
who attend private schools (PRIV), and population usage of welfare is 
measured  by  the  percentage of  families with  a head  over sixty-five 
(OLD), or headed by a female (FHH).22  Per capita state income (INC), 
exogenous federal aid to state governments (LSGRS, LSEA, CEM, 
LSWA, OFA), exogenous federal aid to local governments (educational 
impact aid  [IMPA] and low-income housing aid [LHAI), and federal 
assistance given directly to households (earned income tax credit [EITC] 
and food stamps [FS]), are used to specify, collectively, the coalitions’ 
full fiscal incomes.23  Two variables are included to specify coalitions’ 
tastes for education-percentage  of high school graduates (HS) and the 
average number of children per family (KIDS)-and  three variables are 
used to measure coalitions’ tastes for low-income assistance including 
the exposure to poverty or to the risks of poverty: percentage of pop- 
ulation in urban areas (METRO), the state unemployment rate (UE), 
and percentage of state population employed in manufacturing (MAN). 
Political structure is defined by  the percentage of the population in 
each voter coalition-R  and P,  with M  omitted from the regressions 
to avoid singularity-and  by the percentage of population that is white 
(WHT) as a proxy for possible political discrimination and/or relative 
voter participation. We  also include a vector of state dummy variables 
to control for the many institutional differences in the budgetary pro- 
cess across state~.~~  Finally, the state’s budgetary  status quo is rep- 
resented  by  a lagged  vector of  educational services-lagged  school 
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school employee (WAG  ,), and lagged nonpersonnel expenditures per 
public enrollee (NPEXP-  ,)-and  by lagged state welfare expenditures 
per capita (SWL- ,). All fiscal variables and state income are measured 
in per capita units and are deflated by a state cost of living index.2s 
The error term  specification  of our model assumes that our state 
dummy variables will capture all systematic effects across states that 
are correlated with the included exogenous variables. Previous analysis 
(Craig and Inman 1982) suggests that a time trend may also be appro- 
priate with this  sample to control for the systematic upward  drift in 
state spending.  With  both state dummy variables  and  a  time  trend 
included as  exogenous variables we feel that the remaining unmeasured 
determinants of taxes and  spending captured by u,(t = SAE, SWL, 
and SREV) are randomly distributed across states and time. This least- 
squares dummy variable estimati0.n procedure has been shown to ap- 
proximate closely two-way error components estimation (see Baltagi 
1981). We do, however, permit error term interdependence across rev- 
enue and spending within states and years. Such cross-equation inter- 
dependence is to be expected in budgetary models; estimation by gen- 
eralized least squares (GLS) is appropriate.26 
The model as estimated is clearly a reduced-form specification of the 
structural model given in equations (3)  and (4).  Thus we cannot identify 
the relative  importance of  the various  coalitions  in  state budgetary 
policy, nor the exact role political structure plays in setting spending 
or taxes. We  can, however, identify the effects of federal aid on state 
budgetary  outcomes, and that is our central concern here.27  Section 
7.4 summarizes our results based upon GLS estimation of the budget 
model. 
7.4  State Fiscal Policy 
Table 7.1 summarizes our estimates of a state budgetary model for 
state assistance for education (SAE), state welfare spending (SWL), 
state revenue (SREV), and, via the budget identity, other state expen- 
ditures financed from current revenues (OEXP). The results across all 
three estimated equations tell a consistent, and upon reflection a not 
too surprising, story: education assistance, welfare spending, and broad- 
based  tax relief  are not  the favored  outlets for state dollars.  State 
politicians prefer to spend state public dollars on OEXP, the treasure 
chest of  many  small, favored public  projects that keep constituents 
from all corners of  the state content. If the federal government wishes 
to stimulate state spending on human  services-education and low- 
income  assistance-it  must impose strong spending  regulations  and 
matching requirements on federal aid, and even these requirements will 
not keep some dollars from leaking into OEXP. 202  Steven R. Craig/Robert P.  Inman 
Table 7.1  GLS Estimation Results 






CEM'  INC 
(I-m) 





























-  .20* 
(.08) 















-  7.98' 
(1.22) 
-  263.28' 
(91.35) 
-  5.53 
(8.01) 
-25.16 
(  17.68) 




-  12.78 
33.33 
(25.00) 
-  .25' 
(.lo) 































(1  0.22) 
.34 
(  .29) 






-  14.34 
(46.09) 





























-  3 12.30' 
(152.42) 
27.77' 
(  13.34) 




-  3.46' 
-415.90' 203  Education, Welfare, and the  “New” Federalism 
Table 7.1  (continued) 
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‘Indicates significance at  10% level. 
a. Individual state dummy variables. See appendix 7A.2 for parameter estimates. 
b. From OLS. Estimation is by GLS. 
Nothing  reveals  this pattern  more clearly  than  an analysis of  the 
initial impact effects of the major federal-to-state aid programs, begin- 
ning  with  the  least  restrictive  grant-general  revenue  sharing-and 
moving to the most regulated grant-open-ended  categorical matching 
aid. 
1.  Generd Revenue  Sharing. The  marginal effects of  a dollar  of 
lump-sum revenue-sharing aid (LSGRS) on each of the two estimated 
expenditure items-SAE  and SWL-are  negative and, in the case of 
SWL, statistically different from zero. Estimated at the mean value of 
LSGRS (= $2.84/capita), a dollar of  GRS aid will reduce state edu- 
cation aid by  $.08 and state welfare spending by $.09. LSGRS is es- 
timated to increase state revenues by  $.09, but the effect is not statis- 
tically significant. OEXP is  clearly the  net  recipient  of  GRS funds. 
From the budget identity-equation  (4)-we  can estimate the average 
effect of  a small change in LSGRS on OEXP as AOEXP = ALSGRS 
- ASAE - (I -rnO)ASWL  +  (1  + 4e)ASREV  =  I  - (- .08) - 
The  “tax  effort”  component  of  revenue-sharing (e)  has only tiny 
effects on the state budget; the estimated coefficients are insignificant, 
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except for SWL, and the implied elasticities of spending and revenue 
with respect  to e never exceed  .01. What small budget effects result 
from an increase in the effort rate favor SAE and OEXP. 
2.  Categorical, Lump-Sum Aid. There are three categorical, lump- 
sum grants considered here, one for each expenditure category: LSEA 
(education), LSWA (welfare), and OFA (OEXP). These grants are nom- 
inally restricted to be spent only on the specified programs. However, 
states can comply with the terms of the grant by spending the aid dollar 
as specified but then cutting back on their own expenditures on closely 
related state-funded projects. Some, or perhaps even all, of the cate- 
gorical aid dollars can thereby be “released” for allocations elsewhere 
in  the budget.  This is in fact what  happens with  LSWA and  LSEA 
assistance. A dollar of federal lum-sum welfare aid (LSWA) increases 
state welfare spending by only $.076, of which the state pays only the 
fraction (1 - me) or $.03 (=  .4 x  .076). LSWA also lowers  state 
education aid spending by $.20. This decline in SAE is not surprising 
since many  of  targeted  programs  in  LSWA  assistance are for low- 
income, school-age children.  The total  “released”  dollars for each 
dollar of federal LSWA is $1.17, $.97 from welfare and $.20 from ed- 
ucation. However, only $.12 of these released dollars are allocated to 
revenue relief; dSREV/dLSWA = -  .12. OEXP receives the remaining 
$1.05. 
LSEA is somewhat more productive when it comes  to keepingfederal 
aid dollars within the target category, perhaps because a major com- 
ponent of LSEA is Title I school assistance for low-income children 
and this program has been closely monitored by federal auditors. Ap- 
proximately $.43 of each LSEA dollar remains in SAE; dSAE/dLSEA 
= .43.29  Welfare spending rises by $.23 as well, perhaps because of a 
regulatory spillover onto child welfare programs. Not all of the LSEA 
dollars remain in human services, however. Each dollar of aid increases 
education plus the state share of welfare spending by $.52 (= .43 + 
.23(1 - me) = .43 + (.23 x  .4)) so $.48 is allocated to tax relief and 
OEXP. The coefficient of LSEA on SREV suggests tax relief receives 
$.39 per dollar of aid, leaving $.09 for OEXP. 
Other federal aid (OFA) helps only OEXP. A dollar of OFA leads to 
a $. 16  reduction in SAE, a $.057 reduction in SWL with a state share 
of  $.025 (= .057(1 - me) =  .057  X  .4) and a $.005  rise in  SREV; 
overall OEXP rises by $1.19 (= 1  + .16 + .025 + .005). 
3. Categorical, Closed-ended Matching Aid. A prominent form of 
categorical federal assistance is to require the state to “match” a fixed 
amount of federal aid with some corresponding number of state dollars 
at a given mark-up--e.g., $2 of state money for each dollar of federal 
aid. (The fact that the amount of federal aid is fixed distinguishes these 
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these levered dollars will stay within the program area. However, in 
the case of education and welfare aid (school breakfast and lunch as- 
sistance and low-income commodity assistance) there is only partial 
retention; again OEXP captures the spillover. The average required 
mark-up of federal aid dollars can be estimated from the SREV equation 
as the increase in state revenues induced by a dollar increase in CEM 
aid:  aSREV/dCEM  =  .61  +  .00035  *  INC.  Evaluated  at  the  mean 
income in  our sample (INC  = $2950/capita) the implicit state match 
for the  CEM program  is  1.64. The rate of  mark-up rises  with  state 
income as is in fact required  by  the federal law for the programs in 
CEM. For the average income state, therefore, a dollar of federal aid 
must be matched by $1.64 of state money. Thus $2.64 flows into the 
categorical  program areas in education and welfare.  Only  $1.03 re- 
mains, however-$.98  in education spending and $.05 in welfare as- 
sistance. OEXP captures the residual flow of  $1.64 (= 2.64 - .98 - 
.05(1 - me)  =  1.66 - (.05  x  .4)). It is clear that the federal match 
requirement  brings more dollars into the target programs, but  it also 
provides state legislators with a reason to increase taxes and to real- 
locate all of that increase to their favored programs in OEXP. 
4.  Open-ended Matching Aid.  The most regulated of the federal aid 
programs is an open-ended matching grant that operates as a tax-price 
subsidy. Aid  is only received when dollars are spent on the targeted 
program, and further, additional state spending is rewarded with ad- 
ditional federal aid. The net effect of  such assistance is to lower the 
per unit costs to taxpayers of  providing the aided service. If  m is the 
open-ended federal matching rate and 8 is the share of state spending 
covered by  aid, then (1 - me)  is the share of  expenditures that must 
be paid by taxpayers. The major open-ended matching grants now used 
by the federal government are for the state provision of welfare spend- 
ing on AFDC and Medicaid. For all states participating in the program, 
the rate m varies from a low of  .5 for the richer states (INC a  national 
average income) to a high of  .78 for the poorest states. The share of 
total welfare spending in AFDC and Medicaid (0) is = .8 for states in 
our sample. We  have estimated the effects of (1 -  me)  on state spending 
and revenues.’O  Calculated at the means, the implied tax price elastic- 
ities for (1 - me)  are  +  .22 for SAE (a positive cross-price effect), 
-  .I7 for SWL (a negative own-price effect), -  .08 for OEXP (a neg- 
ative cross-price effect), and + .07 for SREV (implying a negative cross- 
price elasticity of  -  .001 for private income). Welfare and education 
are (loosely speaking) substitutes in the state budget, while welfare, 
private  income, and  other  expenditures  are complements.  If  states 
transfer more income to the poor, they apparently transfer more income 
to other income classes also. The transfers are facilitated by a reduction 
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flows to the middle- and upper-income groups may exceed those to the 
poor. Again, we do our calculations for the average state. A rise in the 
average state’s effective matching rate (me)  from .60 to .615 will bring 
in $I/capita more in welfare matching aid. This additional dollar will 
initially be spent on the targeted activity increasing state welfare ex- 
penditures by  $.34. The additional $.34 of SWL brings in an additional 
$.21 (= .615 . .34) of  aid. As m increases,  (1 - me) falls and SAE 
falls, too-by  approximately  $.54.  SREV also falls by  an estimated 
$.63. OEXP rises, however, by  $.78 (=  $1  - ASAE - ASWL(1 - 
.615) + ASREV  = $1  + .54 - .34(.385) - .63). Again, other expen- 
ditures and tax relief are the favored outlets for federal assistance, even 
when that assistance is targeted to the poor. 
This pattern of state spending, which allocates new, marginal dollars 
towards OEXP, is also observed in how states react to federal assistance 
that bypasses the state and is paid to local governments and to house- 
holds directly. Such federal aid will  still be available to state legislators 
if they are willing to tax back some or all of the aid through an increase 
in state revenues. For the earned income tax credit (EITC) and food 
stamps (FS) paid directly to low-income households, and for federal 
impact  school aid  (IMPA) paid  to school districts, this  seems to be 
what happens. We  do not observe a statistically  significant tax-back 
effect with low-income housing aid (LHA) paid to local governments. 
For a state with the average EITC grant (= $2.9l/capita), a dollar of 
EITC assistance triggers a  $SO increase in  state revenues, which is 
allocated entirely to school aid ($.47) and state welfare ($.25, of which 
the state pays .25(1 - me) = .25 x  .4 = $.lo); here OEXP seems to 
lose on average (- $.07). There is a similar tendency to tax back food 
stamp assistance. A dollar of food stamp aid to the household sector 
is offset in  part by  a $.69 increase in SREV, which is spent on SAE 
($.34), on welfare ($.12, which requires $.05 from the state = .12(1 - 
me) = .12 x  .4) and on OEXP ($.30). School impact aid (IMPA) has 
the most pronounced effect on SREV-$3.22  for each dollar of federal- 
to-local school aid (!)-and  OEXP is a main beneficiary, receiving $1.68 
after the SAE ($1.16) and SWL ($.95), with a state share = .95  x  .4 
= .38) allocations. We  have difficulty rationalizing the size of this effect 
of IMPA on SREV, however, particularly since our earlier work (Craig 
and Inman  1982) for a shorter, but largely overlapping sample period 
(1965-77) found a large, negative effect of this aid on state taxes. We 
can only suggest a cautious use of the IMPA results. Finally, a dollar 
of  federal-to-local housing aid (LHA) has a modest positive, but not 
statistically significant, effect on SREV ($. 12) and depressing, but not 
significant, effects on SAE (-$.76)  and SWL (-$.32);  if  we accept 
these coefficients as measuring average effects, OEXP spending rises 
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considered here, a dollar of increased federal aid to each program will 
stimulate a full tax-back of $4.53, allocated to $1.21 to SAE, $1.00 to 
SWL (of which the state pays $.40 due to m0 aid), and $2.92 to OEXP. 
Increases in average state income (INC) stimulate a larger state bud- 
get, with low-income assistance and “other expenditures”  as the fa- 
vored outlets. A dollar of INC increases SREV by $.025, which induces 
a $303 rise in SAE, a $.008 rise in SWL (though the state share is only 
.0032), and a .019 rise in OEXP. The private income elasticity of demand 
for state education assistance is  .13, .45 for state welfare assistance, 
.26 for “other expenditures,” and .32 for state revenues. Our results 
also confirm the presence of a flypaper effect on state budgets. Most 
all of  private income stays in the private  sector; most all public aid 
dollars stay in the public sector. 
The nonaid variables included in the analysis to reflect across-state- 
and-time changes in voter coalition bliss points and political structure 
reveal no major surprises. The three tax price variables-OLD,  PRIV, 
and FHH-are  either insignificant or, as in the case of  FHH in  the 
SWL equation, significant and of the correct sign. The coefficients for 
the five “taste”  variables-HS,  KIDS, METRO, UE, MAN-reveal 
a revenue-spending pattern that favors OEXP and tax relief over human 
services (SAE, SWL) in those states with a large number of existing 
manufacturing jobs, which are heavily urbanized, with relatively high 
rates of unemployment (though SWL does increase in response to UE), 
fewer children per family, and more  high  school graduates.31 These 
states tend to be the older, urbanized  states of  the east, south, and 
midwest. One plausible explanation for this observed spending pattern 
is that these are also the states under intense fiscal pressure as they 
struggle to retain mobile capital and jobs. What business wants is tax 
relief and “other expenditures,”  not school aid and welfare, and the 
states seem to be responsive. 
The political structure variables-R,  P,  WHT, and the individual state 
constant terms-show  state fiscal policy is not responsive to the income 
class  divisions  as measured  here,  once we  have accounted  for the 
effects of  average income.  While  income  class  seems unimportant, 
racial divisions are not. As the percentage of  the state’s population 
becomes more white, fewer dollars are allocated to SAE and to SWL, 
the human service portion of the state budget. Quantitatively, the ef- 
fects of major swings in the racial composition of the state are impor- 
tant; states one standard deviation below the mean percentage white 
spend approximately $24/capita more on human services and $13/capita 
less on OEXP than states one standard deviation above the mean per- 
centage ~hite.3~  The individual state constant terms meant to capture 
the idiosyncratic nature  of  state political  structures are reported  in 
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As we emphasized in section 7.2, state budgetary  politics is a dy- 
namic process. Our results illustrate the importance of these dynamics. 
First, from the coefficient on TIME we observe a continual upward 
drift in real state spending and revenue over time, favoring SAE ($6.64/ 
capita per year) and OEXP ($3.20/capita per year = ASREV - ASAE 
- ASWL(1 - me)  = 10.21 - 6.64 - .92(.4)). Second, our theory of 
budgetary politics predicts an important role for the level of last year’s 
services in this year’s budgeting (the status quo) and our empirical 
analysis confirms this prediction. We have modeled the dynamics of 
the political process by  including lagged service levels for education 
(PER-,  , WAG-, ,  and NPEXP- ,) and welfare (SWL- ,)  in each of the 
three estimated budget equations; the lagged service variables are al- 
ways statistically significant as a set.)) Further, the implied dynamic 
adjustment process has important implications for the final disburse- 
ment of  fiscal resources. While the feedback effects of lagged school 
services on state spending and taxes are modest with most effects of 
a fiscal change felt in  the first year, lagged  welfare  spending has  a 
quantitatively  important  impact-particularly  on  SWL, SREV,  and 
OEXP-that  takes from four to six years to be fully felt.34  There is an 
inertia in state welfare budgeting, as legislators seem reluctant to ex- 
pand or cut welfare spending too quickly, perhaps because they are 
concerned about the reaction of neighboring states (see Gramlich 1982). 
Table 7.2 summarizes our estimates of the equilibrium effects of changes 
in each of the exogenous fiscal variables in our model allowing for the 
dynamic adjustments to the budget through lagged education and wel- 
fare services.3s  The table reports the equilibrium effects of an additional 
$1 of federal assistance paid either directly to the states or as “bypass” 
assistance to households and local governments. The calculation for 
federal bypass aid allocates $.25 to each of  the four bypass programs 
in our study (EITC, FS, LHA, and IMPA). We also show the equilib- 
rium allocation of an additional dollar of state private income. Quali- 
Table 7.2  Equilibrium Effects of Federal Aid 
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tatively, the equilibrium effects of aid and income parallel the impact 
effects described above:  (1)  OEXP is generally favored, but  (2) the 
more regulated federal aid is, the more likely it is to remain within the 
target expenditure category. Quantitatively, the equilibrium effects of 
aid on the human resource portion of the state budget exceed the impact 
effects of aid, primarily because of lagged adjustments to welfare spend- 
ing. Positive “shocks”  to the human resource budget (via m,  CEM, 
LSEA, LSWA, and INC) increase SAE and  SWL over time  while 
negative shocks (via LSGRS and OFA) decrease SAE and SWL over 
time. OEXP is largely unaffected; it is SREV that adjusts to the changes 
in SAE and SWL. 
Overall, both the impact and the dynamic equilibrium analyses of 
federal assistance to the state-local sector reveal the  same essential 
pattern to desired state spending: federal dollars that flow into the state 
via  grants-in-aid are allocated  disproportionately toward OEXP and 
away from the human services components-SAE  and SWL-of the 
state budget. It is important to know why. This analysis cannot answer 
that question-structural,  not reduced form, models are needed-but 
we will offer one hypothesis that, on its face, we find persuasive. Like 
their counterparts in Washington, state legislators are rewarded with 
reelection  when they  deliver publicly funded programs to their con- 
stituents and when  those  additional  public dollars can be  explicitly 
linked to the efforts of the elected official.36  Public expenditures that 
are most  conducive to district-by-district, constituent-by-constituent 
allocations  are those outlays that  can  be  allocated  by  legislative or 
bureaucratic choice, not formula. Both welfare assistance and school 
aid are disbursed according to preestablished formulas.37  The real bat- 
tles for state dollars are fought in the nonformula expenditures-that 
is, in OEXP. Thus the more money to OEXP the better, for it makes 
all legislators better  The major state services provided by OEXP 
dollars include state highway maintenance  (potholes and jobs), state 
hospitals and medical centers (health care and jobs), universities (ed- 
ucational opportunity and jobs), parks (recreation and jobs), and state 
bureaucracies  (services and jobs). Each  of  these  programs  permits 
discretion in dollar allocations. From these OEXP programs, alterna- 
tive omnibus spending bills can be fashioned  to ensure majority ap- 
proval of the state budget. OEXP is the grease or “pork”  that keeps 
the wheels of state politics in motion. In such a world, it is not surprising 
that federal aid dollars are rechanneled whenever possible into “other 
expenditures .” 
Nor is it surprising that those interested in reducing the size of gov- 
ernment should wish to reduce and/or restructure the federal aid sys- 
tem. President Reagan’s “new federalism” reforms can be viewed as 
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The likely impact of the Reagan reforms on state budgets is described 
in section 7.5. The president will not be disappointed with the results. 
7.5  The Budgetary Effects of  the New Federalism 
President Reagan’s new federalism is a three-step reform package 
whose primary intention-Washington  rhetoric aside-is  to reduce fed- 
eral and state-local government spending.  Step 1 of the reform is to 
turn the AFDC and food stamp programs over to the states  for financing 
and administration.  In step 2 the federal government will assume full 
responsibility for Medicaid.  Step 3 gives the states financial respon- 
sibility for sixty-one domestic aid programs in exchange for a lump- 
sum transfer per capita from a newly established trust fund, with trust 
fund  payments reduced gradually  until,  by  1992, no further federal 
lump-sum  aid  will  be paid  to the  states. Table  7.3 summarizes the 
predicted equilibrium effects of these reforms on the allocation of state 
budgets to SAE, SWL, OEXP, and SREV. 
The baseline  for our simulation is the  “average”  in  each budget 
category  for our sample  states in  1980; see table 7.3. This average 
prereform budget for 1980 is then adjusted by the equilibrium budgetary 
responses to changes in  federal grants-in-aid  for each of two major 
components of the new federalism  reform:  the welfare  exchange of 
AFDC and food stamps for Medicaid and the exchange of trust fund 
aid for sixty-one categorical programs. First, the simulations assume 
each component of the reform is done separately-the  columns labeled 
“welfare exchange” and “trust fund exchange” in table 7.3-and  then 
simulations are performed for the entire new federalism package with 




SAE  SWL  OEXPh  SREV  Aid 
Prereform (  1980)  $  77.30  $60.59  $235.74  $266.33  $107.30 
(1) welfare exchange  $  99.92  $21.47  $261.75  $306.31  $  76.83 
(2) trust fund 
exchange  $  73.81  $40.52  $233.54  $251.46  $  96.41 
(3) new federalism 
(1988)  $  96.42  $  1.39  $259.57  $291.44  $  65.94 
(4)  new federalism 
(1992 + )  $105.55  $23.32  $168.20  $297.07  = 0 
a. All dollar figures are in real 1966 dollars per capita. 
b. In all simulations, OEXP is calculated as the residual category to balance the state 
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full trust fund aid (the column labeled “new federalism, 1988”) and 
then without trust fund aid (labeled “new federalism, 1992+”). For 
each simulation, we assume that (1) the effect  of requiring state re- 
sponsibility  is equivalent to setting federal aid equal to zero for the 
affected programs, (2) trust fund aid is equivalent to a lump-sum grant- 
in-aid, and (3) the federal assumption of Medicaid payments will induce 
state budget responses equivalent to those now observed for a similar 
existing federal-to-poor-household aid program, food stamps. We  also 
assume the  earned income  tax  credit  (EITC) will  be unaffected  by 
reform.39 
The transfer of food stamp aid and AFDC to the states and of  Med- 
icaid to  the federal level is functionally equivalent to setting the welfare 
matching rate (m)  to zero, food stamp aid (FS) to zero, and establishing 
Medicaid assistance as a federal-to-household bypass aid program. The 
combined effects of these reforms are dominated by the change in the 
welfare matching rate from m  =  .6 to m  = 0.  Equilibrium welfare 
spending falls by 65%. State-own revenues rise somewhat to offset the 
fall in federal-to-state  aid; these dollars along with  the state dollars 
released  from the welfare budget are allocated  to education aid and 
other state expenditures. The exchange of trust-fund aid for categorical 
aid has a somewhat different pattern of effects, and favors tax relief. 
State assumption of federal categorical aid implies all federal-to-state 
aid (LSEA, CEM, LSWA, OFA) and all federal-to-local aid (IMPA, 
LHA) in our model now receive zero funding. In their place, states 
receive  a lump-sum grant from the federal trust fund approximately 
equal to the value of the lost categorical aid.40  Under this component 
of the new federalism package,  state education and welfare spending 
fall, other expenditures remain the same, and state revenues and federal 
aid decline. Again, we observe that once the categorical “strings”  of 
federal human resource aid are untied, dollars leave this portion of the 
state budget; in  this case they go to state tax relief.  Reagan’s  new 
federalism package combines the welfare exchange and the trust fund 
exchange. The policies’ joint effects are not additive, however, because 
of the interaction of aid and spending levels in the equilibrium model. 
When full trust-fund aid is paid to the states (the new federalism to 
1988), SAE and OEXP are the clear net gainers, while state taxes rise 
and state welfare falls to almost nothing. The welfare exchange plus 
the strong negative effect of LSGRS on state welfare spending (see 
tables 7.1 and 7.2) are responsible for this large fall in  SWL. When 
federal trust fund aid is removed in 1992, we observe a increase in state 
own revenues, SAE and SWL, and a sizable fall in OEXP. 
While the exact dollar predictions  in table 7.3 must be interpreted 
with care, we feel the overall impression left by these simulations is 
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ing, increase education spending, reduce state expenditures on “other” 
goods and services, and increase state revenues. The combined size 
of federal-state-local government will also decline. Though state (and 
possibly local) government revenues increase (by about $30/capita in 
table 7.3), federal spending is reduced by the amount of  saved federal 
aid  ($107.30/capita) less any increases in  federal Medicaid spending 
(=  $17/capita, if  1980 average state Medicaid spending is maintained). 
On balance, it appears the new federalism of President Reagan will 
achieve its objectives. Government, and particularly pork-barrel gov- 
ernment, is smaller. The possible price we pay is less public assistance 
for low-income ho~seholds.~~ 
7.6  A Concluding Comment 
The U.S.  federalist public economy has evolved to the point where 
today the federal government is the primary provider of public dollars 
and the state-local sector is the primary provider of public services. 
There are good reasons to doubt the efficiency of such a fiscal structure, 
particularly  if  the wedge between the revenue and spending respon- 
sibility is large. Grants-in-aid is the source of that wedge. Efforts to 
reform our current system of grants-in-aid require a careful understand- 
ing of the effects of aid on state and local fiscal choice: first, to answer 
the question of whether federal aid is a cause of  inefficiency, and, if 
so, to then fashion a reform policy to improve resource  allocation^.^^ 
The formal analysis of  state-local fiscal choice must recognize the fact 
that  state and local governments are political institutions, however, 
and that the grants-in-aid system is an integral part of that institutional 
structure.  This first analysis confirms the importance of  grants as a 
structural determinant of state budgetary choice. The task before us 
now is to reveal more fully just how this structure works and to exploit 
that knowledge to improve public sector resource allocations. 
Appendix 7A.  1 
Data Description 
Dependent  Definition 
variable 
Standard 
Mean  deviation 
SAE  State education spending, deflated, per capita  65.78  23.05 
SWL  State welfare spending, deflated, per capita  52.75  23.11 
SREV  State-own source revenues, deflated, per  233.20  54.66 
capita 213  Education,  Welfare, and the “New” Federalism 
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WAG -  I 
NPEXP-1 
SWL-I 
Federal-state lump sum welfare aid, equals 
total federal-state welfare aid minus 
AFDC, Medicaid, and SSI after 1973, 
deflated, per capita 
deflated, per capita 
Federal-local welfare aid, equals housing aid 
Food Stamps, deflated, per capita 
Earned Income Tax Credit, deflated, per 
State share of federal matching aid 
Other federal aid, excluding welfare, 
education, highway, and general revenue 
sharing aid, deflated, per capita 
state revenue sharing, deflated, per capita 
capita 
Lump-sum component of general federal- 
State effort index for revenue sharing 
Per capita income, deflated 
Lump-sum federal-state education aid, 
including vocational and handicapped aid, 
and Title 1, deflated, per capita 
included school breakfast and lunch and 
commodity distribution, deflated, per 
capita 
Impact federal education aid to local 
governments, deflated, per capita 
Percentage that completed high school 
Average number of children per household 
Percentage below $5,000 annual income 
Percentage 65 years old and over 
Percentage above $25,000 annual income 
Percentage that lives in a metropolitan area 
Percentage unemployed 
Percentage of the population working in 
manufacturing 
Percentage of families headed by a female 
Percentage white 
Percentage of  school-age children in private 
School personnel per enrollee lagged one 
Wages per school personnel lagged one year, 
Nonpersonnel expenditures per capita lagged 
State welfare expenditure lagged one year, 




one year, deflated 
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Appendix 7A.  2 
State Dummy Variables" 
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-  25.98 
40.67 






-  15.95 
-7.37 
23.21 




Standard errors are in parentheses. 
'Indicates  significance at the 5% level. 
a. These estimates are from the model presented in table 7.1. Seven states are excluded: 
Alabama is the base state, Arizona and Texas have no observations,  Missouri and South 
Carolina have only one observation, and Alaska and Hawaii have unique fiscal situations 
that suggest excluding them from our general analysis. 
b. Calculated from the point estimates. 216  Steven R. Craig/Robert P.  Inman 
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1, For a description of the historical evolution of our federalist public economy. see 
Scheiber (1966). 
2.  The federal share of all nondefense, government spending has grown from 28.5% 
in  1902 to 48.8% by  1983. The source of this growth has been the increase in federally 
funded transfer programs to families and to governments. The state-local  sector has 
always been  the main producer  of  public  services. The state-local  sector’s  share of 
nontransfer, nondefense government spending has grown from 71% in 1902 to 84.6% by 
1983. Financial control has become more centralized; production has become less cen- 
tralized. Bridging the widening gap between the financing and provision of public services 
are grants-in-aids; see Inman (1985). 
3.  See Inman (1985). 
4.  See Inman (1985) for some thoughts on this issue based upon the political history 
of our existing fiscal system. 
5.  The level of free g (= g) made available by lump-sum aid is (zln)lc(  I  - m).  As z 
dollars of aid buys zlc(l - m)  units of x and x provides x/n units of g,  =  (xln) = 
(z/n)/c(l - m).  The assumption in this calculation is that  expenditures from z aid can 
be “leveraged”  further by matching aid. 
6.  See the work of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Inman (1978). 
7.  See Inman (1979) for a review of the U.S. experience and Jackman and Pdpadachi 
(1981) and Pommerehne (1978) for examples of applications of the median voter model 
to fiscal choice in European communities. 
8. The  theory predicts that the effects ofI  and (zln)  work only through full fiscal income: 
i. While a dollar more of I increases I by one dollar, a dollar more of (7ln) increases I 
by n(h/B),  which generally is not equal to  1.  If n(b/B)  < I, a dollar of private income 
(I)  should have a greater stimulative effect on the demand for g than a dollar of lump- 
sum aid per capita (z/n).  If n(6lB) = 1, then I and (zln)  should have equal effects on g. 
9.  Two  alternative explanations have been offered for the flypaper effect. Moffitt (1984) 
argues that the flypaper effect may be due to a misspecification of the resident’s budget 
constraint by failing to allow for nonlinearities  of the constraint, e.g.,  the kink in the 
constraint at point C in figure 7. I. Moffitt  explicitly allows for such kinks and bends in 
the resident’s budget constraint when estimating a budgetary model for state welfare 
programs and finds that after such a correction the effects of the lump-sum component 
of such aid cannot be statistically  distinguished from the effects of residential  income. 
i.e.,  there is no flypaper effect. While such nonlinearities  are important in welfare aid, 
and Moffitt is clearly correct to allow for these, most other federal and state aid programs 
for which the flypaper effect has been found do  not involve nonlinear budget constraints 
over the relevant range of local fiscal choice. For most programs, full fiscal income, I, 
or its components I and (zln),  are the correct independent variables. 
Hamilton (1983) has also argued that the flypaper effect is due to an error in specifi- 
cation, now of the technology of local service provision. Resident income plays two 
roles,  not one. Income defines the resident’s available resources, but income also is a 
determinant (or a very good proxy for the true determinants) of local service production. 
It is generally less expensive to provide a given level of services, x. in rich towns than 
in poor towns. Local service costs (c)  depend on I;  as I increases, cAdeclines.  Resident 
income therefore plays two roles: (I) as a part of full fiscal income (0,  and (2) as  a part 
of the production function and local service costs (c). If income increases and c falls, 
then the local tax price falls, and we demand more g (Hamilton’s  output effect). But the 
fall in c means it is cheaper to produce any g and thus we need spend less on public 217  Education, Welfare, and the “New” Federalism 
inputs (Hamilton’s substitution effect). If  the substitution effect dominates the output 
effect, then the total effect of I  through the production relationship on public input use 
will be negative. Thus while resident income and lump-sum aid may have nearly identical 
effects on  local  spending because  of  their  effects on full  fiscal  income (f),  resident 
income  may  have  an  additional, possibly  negative  effect  because  of  its  role  in  the 
production of  local  services. The effect of  I  on local  spending will  be less  than the 
effect of (zin)  on local spending. Hamilton tests his model for plausible parameter values 
and  finds  that  it  accounts for about  half  of  the  observed  flypaper effects.  But  “the 
parameter values required to explain the entire flypaper effect appear to be implausible” 
(Hamilton 1983. 355). Hamilton’s hypothesis, while interesting, cannot really save the 
resident utility  maximization explanation of state-local fiscal choice. Something more 
is needed. 
10.  See Niskanen (1975) for the motivation behind this objective of politician-bureau- 
crat behavior. 
II. See Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1982) or lnman (1981) for alternative model 
specifications. 
12.  This particular positioning of each coalition’s preferred allocations is only illus- 
trative; the analysis that follows holds equally well for alternative combinations of pref- 
erences. Implicit in this particular configuration is the view that education and a concern 
for the less fortunate are both normal goods with respect to income and that all income 
classes also have a social insurance motive for supporting low-income assistance pro- 
grams. Even Boeing engineers have need for food stamps every once in a while. The 
social insurance motive dominates the altruism motive for the poor leading to a high 
welfare demand for this coalition, while the altruism motive is relatively strong for the 
upper-income groups inducing  a relatively high demand for welfare by  this coalition. 
The blue-collar middle class, motivated by neither altruism nor a need for public income 
insurance, has a low demand for welfare. 
13. The relative voting strength of the three coalitions need not be equal for the analysis 
that follows. All that really is required is that no one coalition hold an absolute majority 
by itself, for then the analysis reduces to a study of a dictator and the fiscal model behind 
equation (I) will be sufficient. 
14. Examples of  such jurisdictional  structures are special districts that can decide 
allocations on only one policy dimension, taking the allocation of other special districts 
as given. In our example. a school district decides on g, and a welfare district sets g2. 
We will not consider the interaction between special districts that sets the  joint allocation 
of g,  and g~.  but  see Shepsle (1979) or Inman (1986). 
15.  A fully open amendment process where any proposal can be considered would 
undo the committee and jurisdictional structures and return the decision process to the 
majority-rule-only case and its prediction of no stable equilibrium. 
16. Points off the contract line will always be rejected in favor of points on the contract 
line by  the R-P  coalition, so we need consider only points on the line. 
17. If  the status quo point  is  not fixed  then  a new equilibrium point  will  emerge. 
Specifically, if the budgeting process is a dynamic one in which the last period’s budget 
is the next period’s status quo, then it is possible to show that the group that controls 
the agenda can move the budget allocation arbitrarily close to its ideal point over time. 
For example, if  we repeat the analysis above using t**  as the status quo, the new, next 
period allocation will be on the R-P  contract line closer to the ideal point, R,  than E**. 
18.  See also Denzau and Parks (1979). who provide a general treatment of the problem 
of specifying voter preferences for policy outcomes from a basic preference structure 
over primary goods and services. 
19.  The analysis here assumes the coalitions in conflict  are three consumer groups 
who have demands for the public services. While this is reasonable, the model can be 
extended to allow industry groups or even public employees to have a direct say in the 
final allocations. To formally include such groups in the analysis we must define their 
preferences for outcomes. Niskanen (1975). Inman (1981), and Courant, Gramlich, and 
Rubinfeld (1979) offer such models for public employees, while Stigler (1971) and Peltz- 
man (1976) have specified profit-maximization models of firm or industry preferences for 
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20.  The Romer-Rosenthal analysis can be seen as a special case of this more general 
structure. Specifically, Romer and Rosenthal consider the one  jurisdiction case in which 
the high-spending coalition is the agenda setter. In terms of our analysis, this corresponds 
to  figure 7.3 with  the rich coalition as the agenda setter. The allocation of  E* results, 
which exceeds the allocation that would have emerged from a median voter model (point 
k).  Point  p, our status quo, corresponds to Romer and Rosenthal’s so-called reversion 
level. 
21.  See Reischauer (1975) for estimates of e. 
22.  Our original definition of the tax price in section 7.2 above assumed all taxpayers 
used the public service. A simple recalculation of p  will show that if  n people pay taxes 
(so E . n is still the aggregate tax base) but only u people use the public service (so g 
= xlu), then the definition of p becomes ~(blE)(uln)(l  - m)c. where the new term (uln) 
is the percentage of population that uses the public service. As PRIV rises, (uln) falls 
and the tax price for education falls, while for welfare if OLD or FHH rises, (uln)  rises 
and the tax price for welfare rises. 
23.  Aid  programs explicitly for the elderly, such as Social Security and Medicare, 
have been excluded. Only means-tested programs are included in order to confine the 
analysis to political choice over a common set of goals. Similarly, unemployment and 
training programs such as CETA have been excluded because they are motivated by a 
different set of  coalition determinants. 
24.  Since our continuous aid, income, and demographic variables are likely to capture 
most systematic differences across states in coalitions’ preferences-the  bliss points- 
we are reasonably confident that our state dummy variables will capture the systematic 
effects of state political  and institutional differences  on fiscal  allocations. Exploring 
exactly what these differences might be is the task for later research. 
25.  The cost-of-living index used in this study is an update of an index we created in 
our previous study of federal-state-local finance of education. See Craig-Inman (1982, 
545). 
26.  See Zellner (1962) and Hausman (1978). 
27.  For specialists in  state-local finance, our reduced-form equations will appear (as 
they are) to be “old wine in a new bottle.”  The variables are familiar ones used in most 
previous budgetary models. We  have given them a potentially new interpretation, how- 
ever, an interpretation we find more compelling for reasons outlined in section 7.2 above. 
One note of caution must be sounded before presenting our results. Like all reduced 
form budget studies, we must assume that a change in a policy  variab1e-e.g.. federal 
aid-does not alter the basic political structure that defines spending or revenues. For 
example, less federal aid for the poor does not lead to more or less political influence 
for the poor in state budgeting. If so, the reduced form model will be misspecified. The 
assumption of no structural change is probably valid for small adjustments in federal 
assistance, or for the first few years following large changes in assistance. Our results 
must be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
28.  All marginal effects are calculated at the means. The decision to use a logarithmic 
specification for LSGRS reflects the fact that such aid has generally been found to have 
nonlinear effects on spending and revenues; see Inman (1979). 
29.  LSEA is comparable to “pass-through education aid” of our previous paper (Craig 
and Inman 1982). Comparing the results here to those of our earlier paper shows that 
this aid has a smaller effect on SAE than previously estimated. Additional years and a 
more complete specification in this study lead us to favor these results. 
30.  The estimation of the effects of matching aid is problematic. The voters’ budget 
constraints need not be straight lines, but can have complicated “kinks”  depending on 
whether the state enrolls under one aid formula or another.  The AFDC formula is a 
subtle combination of open-ended and close-ended grants and requires a rather involved 
nonlinear estimation procedure; see  Moffitt (1984). The Medicaid formula, however, 
does not involve  such “kinks”  and by  1974 most  states were  using  this simpler aid 
formula. We  have chosen to restrict our analysis to the sample of states that use the 
Medicaid formula, and then to address the problem of selection bias such a restricted 
sample may impose upon our results. We  have adopted the procedure of Olsen (1980) 
for the correction of  selection bias.  In the SAE and SWL equations the variable to 
correct for selection bias was not significant, implying no bias. The variable was signif- 
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could not apply the procedure to all years in our original sample, however, because of 
data limitations. We  have chosen, therefore, to present the uncorrected results in table 
7.1, under the (largely substantiated) assumption that the bias will be small. 
31. OEXP will rise if  the decline in SAE and SWL dominate any decline in SREV. 
32. The mean percentage white for our sample is 90.07 (s.e. = 8.83). The change in 
percentage white from a low state to a high state is  17.66 % inducing a change in SAE 
of -  $16.42, a change in SWL  of -  $7.24, and a change in SREV of -  $6.53. The resulting 
change in OEXP from the state budget identity is $12.79 (=  ASREV - ASAE  ~  (I  ~ 
rnO)AS WL). 
33.  The fact that education services are provided by local school districts leads us to 
use local school personnel per enrollee (PER),  local school payroll per employee (WAG), 
and nonpersonnel expenditures per enrollee (NPER) as our measures of  education ser- 
vices. State welfare services as social insurance or as a redistributive public good are 
assumed to be available to all  residents equally, so lagged  SWL is  used  to measure 
welfare service levels. 
An F test as to the joint significance of  lagged PER, WAG, NPEXP, and SWL in the 
SAE, SWL, and SREV equations leads us to reject the null hypothesis of no significance 
in each case. The value of the respective F statistics are 6.33 (for SAE), 160 (for SWL), 
and 17.54 (for SREV). 
34.  We  have calculated the dynamic structure for changes in state education aid using 
a local fiscal model  previously estimated in Craig and Inman (1982) that specifies the 
effectsofSAEonPER, WAG, andNPEXP. AchangeinSAE-, changesPER.,, WAG-,, 
and NPEXP-,, which in turn influence SAE, SWL, and SREV today. Tracing through 
the dynamic influences of last year’s SAE on this year’s SAE, SWL,  and SREV, we can 
estimate the influence of one dollar of SAE-, as .059 on SAE, as .007  on SWL, and 
,134 on SREV. Thus the dynamic effects of last year’s state education aid on this year’s 
state budget are small. These results should be contrasted to the effect of a dollar of 
SWL-, on SAE (.17), SWL (.75),  and SREV (.47).  These large marginal effects will take 
several years before adjustment is complete. 
35.  The equilibrium effects of exogenous aid changes on SAE, SWL, and SREV were 
estimated by solving this three equation dynamic model: 
SAE  +X  + .I7 SWL-, + ,059 SAE-I, 
SWL  = pX + .75 SWL.,  +  ,007 SAE-,, and 
SREV  = OX  + .47 SWL-1 + ,134 SAE-I, 
where the impact coefficients +,  p, 8  for the exogenous aid variable (X)  and the coef- 
ficients on SWL-, are as reported in table 7.1, and the coefficients on SAE-I are as 
reported in  note  34 above.  The dynamic equilibrium of  aid changes on  OEXP were 
calculated from the state budget identity. The interpretation of these dynamic results is 
subject to the caveats of note 27 above. 
36.  See for example Fiorina (1977). 
37.  How these formulas are chosen is  itself an important question that we hope to 
address in future research. 
38.  The presumption here is that there is no effective tax relief coalition within the 
state that can divert dollars from OEXP to tax relief on a regular basis. The sporadic 
success of the state tax limitation movements seems to be evidence on this point. 
39.  Before discussing the simulation results we must emphasize that the numbers in 
table 7.3, which look precise, are not.  In calculating equilibrium effects we used all 
estimated aid coefficients in our model, many of which are statistically insignificant (see 
table 7.1).  Further, the policy changes we are simulating can hardly be considered “small” 
changes that fall within  the range of current sample variation.  Whether the observed 
fiscal behavior holds outside the sample is an unanswered question. At best table 7.3 
provides only a first impression of what may happen under the new federalism. 
40. The new federalism reform agreed to pay approximately 90% of the lost categorical 
aid, which was about $73/capita. Thus lump-sum aid from the trust fund will be $65.94. 
41. It is also possible the form of the remaining assistance will change. See Craig and 
Kohlhase (1985). 
42.  The Reagan administration’s reform is only one alternative. See Gramlich (1985) 
for another proposal of merit. 220  Steven R. Craig/Robert P.  Inman 
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COInment  Helen F. Ladd 
This paper follows in the tradition of the authors’ pioneering paper on 
federal aid for public education (Craig and Inman 1982). Like its pre- 
decessor, the paper estimates the magnitude of governmental responses 
to federal aid in order to simulate the effects of recent proposals to 
reform the U.S. federal system. It differs from the earlier paper by the 
addition of a theoretical framework that incorporates the role of politics 
in governmental  decision making and  by  the  simultaneous focus on 
three  types  of  services-welfare,  education,  and  all  other  current 
spending-with  attention to the cross-effects of aid to one category on 
expenditures in the other categories. It is  similar to the earlier paper 
in terms of  the carefully specified intergovernmental aid variables and 
associated income and price effects. 
My  comments are organized into three main areas: the conceptual 
framework and its relationship to the estimated equations; the empirical 
findings; and the simulated effects of  the new federalism proposals. 
Though many of  my  comments are critical, they are not intended to 
belittle the contribution of this type of analysis. Sorting out intergov- 
ernmental fiscal interactions is a complex problem. The authors have 
made a reasonable first step in conceptualizing the problem in a way 
that can be examined empirically. I doubt that they will  disagree with 
my judgment that their paper raises as many questions as it answers 
and that  it  should not  be viewed as the definitive analysis  of  state 
responses to federal aid. At the same time, it sets a high standard in 
terms of specification of the key economic variables and should inspire 
others to pursue some of the political aspects of the modeling problem 
in future research. 
The Theoretical Model and Its Relationship to 
the Estimated Equations 
The median voter model typically serves as the theoretical foundation 
for empirical models of  state and local governmental  spending. Cor- 
rectly  criticizing this model for its oversimplification of the political 
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process, Craig and Inman enrich the model by introducing a bargaining 
process among coalitions of voters. This leads to a model in  which 
spending outcomes are weighted  averages of the bliss  points  of the 
major coalitions. The weights reflect the political power of the various 
coalitions,  and  the bliss  points  reflect  the standard determinants of 
individual demand functions, namely  tax prices, tastes, and income, 
appropriately defined to include intergovernmental lump-sum aid. This 
conceptual  formulation implies that estimating equations should include 
tax prices and income by voting coalition, measures of political power, 
and status quo service levels as measures of the reversion  levels of 
spending. 
Correctly specified, this approach would lead to a set of estimating 
equations that differ  in  significant  ways  from  those derived  from a 
more  traditional model. The reported equations, however,  resemble 
only  slightly  the  theoretical  model,  at least  so far as the  political 
aspects of the model are concerned. First, the voter coalitions are not 
very  carefully  defined.  Consistent with  the authors’ presentation of 
the conceptual model (though not necessarily consistent with political 
reality), the three coalitions incorporated into the equations are rich, 
middle-class, and poor households. The political power of these groups 
is measured simply by the proportion of households in each category. 
Given the empirical definitions, the average proportions in the high- 
and  low-income  coalitions  are only  3%  and  14%,  respectively.  Al- 
though people with high  income  may  well exert political  power out 
of proportion to their numbers, the tiny proportion of wealthy house- 
holds in the empirical analysis argues against viewing them as a pow- 
erful political force. Not surprisingly, none of the coefficients of these 
political  power  variables  is  statistically  significant  in  any  of  the 
equations. 
I  suspect that the problem  is  less one of  finding  the appropriate 
income cutoff than one of identifying the appropriate dimension along 
which  to identify  coalitions. This is  consistent with the finding that 
another composition variable,  the nonwhite percentage of  the popu- 
lation, enters the equations with statistically significant and nontrivial 
coefficients.  This issue of identifying the relevant  coalitions is a dif- 
ficult one for economists, but one that cannot be ignored as  economists 
venture further into the world of political economy. Further compli- 
cating the estimating  process is the  possibility  that the identity  or 
composition of these coalitions might vary from one state to another. 
The only other aspect of the political model explicitly included in 
the equation is lagged values of service or spending levels. According 
to the authors’ conceptual formulation,  these variables  should serve 
as reversion levels, that is, the level to which services will revert if the 224  Steven R. Craig/Robert P.  Inman 
current budget is not approved. This interpretation leads, I believe, to 
a predicted negative sign in the relevant spending equation. The lower 
the reversion  level, the greater the spending that can gain  majority 
support from a high-spending agenda setter. Similarly, the higher the 
reversion level, the lower the spending that can gain majority support 
from a low-spending agenda setter. Clearly, however, other interpre- 
tations of the role of these variables are possible, as the authors discuss 
in more detail in their 1982 paper. This is fortunate, since most of these 
variables enter the spending equations with the more commonly pre- 
dicted positive sign. My point is simply that the equations reported by 
Craig and Inman do not provide much of a test of the political model 
so carefully elaborated in the first half of the paper. In this sense, the 
empirical work is disappointing. 
Empirical Findings 
In contrast to the limited attention paid to political variables in the 
equation specifications, the authors devote substantial  attention to eco- 
nomic variables such as income and tax prices. As we have come to 
expect in work by Craig and Inman, tax prices are adjusted for itemizing 
under the federal income tax (although how they deal with variation 
across jurisdictions in the frequency of itemizing is not clear from the 
text); open-ended matching grants are appropriately  differentiated from 
closed-ended matching grants; and revenue sharing is divided into two 
parts, a lump-sum component and a tax-effort component (defined in 
a curious way, as pointed out below). 
The distinguishing characteristic of this paper is its attention to the 
multiple effects of federal aid, that is, the effects of aid to a particular 
category on that category of  spending, on other spending categories, 
and on tax revenues. The basic strategy involves estimating spending 
equations for two of the three spending categories, welfare and edu- 
cation, and a tax equation, and then to derive the impact on a third 
spending category, all other spending, by making use of a current op- 
erating budget constraint. 
The broad conclusions of the empirical analysis seem plausible, namely 
(1) that the more specific the grant program is, the more likely it is that 
some of the aid will stay put and (2)  that states divert some of the aid 
intended for social services to other expenditures. At the same time, 
many of the estimated coefficients are implausible and should not be 
taken too seriously. This  last point  can be illustrated  with  revenue 
sharing aid. 
The results imply that revenue sharing aid reduces welfare spending, 
reduces state education spending,  may  slightly increase state taxes, 
and increases spending on the “all  other” category.  Specifically, an 225  Education, Welfare, and the “New” Federalism 
additional dollar of revenue sharing leads to an increase in  spending 
on all other services of  $1.21.  I  find  this  impact  on other services 
highly implausible. Unlike  narrowly defined categorical grants, reve- 
nue sharing serves neither as seed money to promote additional spend- 
ing nor specifically encourages spending that would lead to additional 
complementary  spending out of  own-source revenues.  Not directly 
estimated, this figure of  $1.21 is derived  from the budget constraint 
and the somewhat questionable coefficients of  revenue sharing aid in 
the other equations. The authors provide  no explanation  for the es- 
timated reduction in welfare and school aid; why higher revenue shar- 
ing should lead to this response for welfare spending is baffling. Re- 
ductions in  state school aid are also hard to understand. A possible 
explanation  is  that  some of  the  revenue  sharing  aid  goes to  local 
governments who then require less state aid. This explanation would 
be more  compelling,  however,  if  local  revenue sharing funds were 
distributed  to local  school districts as well  as local general-purpose 
governments. 
Revenue sharing is estimated to have a small positive effect on state 
taxes. Here, reverse causation could be a serious problem. Both the 
three-factor and the five-factor formulas for distributing revenue shar- 
ing include a tax-effort factor so that states with high taxes in relation 
to income receive larger revenue sharing grants. This relationship leads 
to a simultaneity problem and implies that the equations probably un- 
derstate the extent to which revenue sharing aid reduces state taxes. 
The failure of the authors to consider this simultaneity is curious. They 
explicitly control for the component of tax effort related to the use of 
state income taxes, but ignore this more basic component, which is 
potentially much larger. 
The diversion of intergovernmental  aid funds to all other spending 
turns out to be the most pervasive finding of the empirical work. The 
authors explain  this finding by  hypothesizing  that nonsocial  service 
programs  are politically  more attractive to state policymakers  than 
social service programs  since additional public dollars in these areas 
can be explicitly linked to  the efforts of the elected official. Since other 
spending plays such an important part in the results, I wish the authors 
had estimated the equation directly. Why didn’t they do this? I suspect 
the answer is that current spending on other functional categories can- 
not be readily derived from the data. To the extent that capital spending 
is financed out of current tax revenue, it becomes difficult to derive a 
measure of current spending on all other goods. If such a variable could 
be constructed, I would guess the aid coefficients might be smaller than 
those derived from the budget constraint. This would then imply that 
revenue sharing or other aid was used to build up surplus or reduce 226  Steven R. CraiglRobert P.  lnman 
debt, a conclusion that would reduce the plausibility of the authors’ 
hypothesis that funds are diverted to programs that provide more im- 
mediate political gratification. 
Simulations of the New Federalism 
Three main  points  need  to be  made. First, while the simulations 
probably present a realistic picture at a very general level, the implau- 
sible empirical results discussed above quite naturally lead to implau- 
sible simulations. The finding that revenue sharing aid decreased wel- 
fare spending, for example, means that the simulated effects of switching 
from  categorical  grants to lump-sum aid  distributed  through  a  trust 
fund reduce state welfare spending almost to zero, a result that seems 
highly improbable. 
Second, I  find it rather odd that the authors discuss President Rea- 
gan’s 1982 federalism proposals in the present tense, given that state 
and local officials and Congress have made it clear that they will not 
accept the  main  feature of the proposal, namely,  the transfer of re- 
sponsibility for AFDC and food stamps to the states in exchange for 
federal takeover of the Medicaid program. This makes the simulations 
simply an exercise in examining what might have been. At one level 
this is not very useful, especially given the historical trend toward more 
rather than less centralization of income-support programs. At another 
level,  however,  the  simulations are important  because they help us 
better understand  the generic issue, that is, the question of how state 
governments are likely to respond to changes in federal aid programs. 
I would have preferred that the simulations had been discussed in this 
broader context. 
This leads me to my third and most important point. How appropriate 
is it to use past behavior to simulate the effects of major changes in 
our intergovernmental  system? Predicting effects of changes that are 
large relative to the changes observed historically is always worrisome 
but  one that we  cannot usually  do anything about. Here, however, 
there is additional cause for concern. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
state governors played  a  much  larger role than  state legislatures  in 
allocating federal aid money. Indeed, some federal programs prohibited 
legislative involvement,  presumably  based on the argument that the 
states were simply acting as the administrative arm of the federal gov- 
ernment. With the recent shift to block grants and the pressure on state 
service levels related to cutbacks in federal aid, however, state legis- 
latures have started to play a much larger role (see Doolittle 1984). Any 
federalism reform of the scope of that proposed by President Reagan 
would presumably accelerate this shift of power to the legislature. To 
the extent that economists are serious about introducing political ele- 
ments into expenditure models, this changing mix of political power at 
the state level should not be ignored. 227  Education,  Welfare, and the “New”  Federalism 
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